MODERN PHILOSOPHY [Electronic resources] نسخه متنی

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The Period of the
Enlightenment in France


The Philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseau




TABLE OF CONTENTS


I.
French Illuminism and the "Encyclopedie"

  • Julien Offroy
    de La Mettrie & Paul Heinrich Holbach

  • Claude Adrien Helvetius &
    Baron de Montesquieu

  • Jean Le Rond d'Alembert &
    Denis Diderot

  • Francois Marie Arouet (Voltaire)


  • II.
    The Sensationalism of Abbe de Condillac


    III.
    Jean Jacques Rousseau

  • Life and Works

  • Doctrine

  • The "Social
    Contract"

  • "Emile"




  • The
    vast intellectual movement which made its appearance at the close of the
    "Glorious Revolution" in England (1688) and continued until the
    French Revolution (1789) is called Illuminism, or the
    Enlightenment. The new culture, advancing under the aegis of
    "reason," launched itself in bitter opposition to all the past in general, and in particular to the Middle Ages. According to
    the Illuminati -- the exponents of the Enlightenment -- the Middle
    Ages, victim of philosophical and religious prejudices, had not made use of
    "reason," and hence they called it the age of obscurantism, or the
    Dark Ages. The new philosophy, on the other hand, was to introduce an age of
    enlightenment; it was to dispel the darkness of the past.




    I. French Illuminism
    and the "Encyclopedie"


    France borrowed Illuminism
    from England, the land of its birth. This
    adoption of Illuminism was brought about by the great
    admiration which the French world of culture felt toward all things English.
    French thinkers preferred Locke to Descartes because the former traced philosophical
    problems back to their original basis, sensation. They admired Newton's mechanism and the English
    Constitution. In a word, the cultured French created for themselves the English
    myth. Letters, ties of friendship, and frequent trips across the Channel by
    noted Frenchmen of the times, such as Voltaire, are manifest proof of this
    lofty esteem for things English.


    However,
    French thinkers did not receive Illuminism passively.
    France was always the land of clear
    and distinct ideas (Descartes); and as soon as Illuminism
    made its appearance there, French philosophers were able and quick to elicit
    the extreme consequences hidden beneath the surface of Illuminist thought.
    Promptly divining the far-reaching conclusions that could be drawn from Illuminism, the French adopted it as an efficacious and
    speedy means of relieving France from all the evils that had
    befallen her after the demise of the Sun King, Louis XIV. Thus if England was the birthplace of the new
    philosophy of the Enlightenment, France was to become the classic home
    of Illuminism.


    The
    French Illuminists placed full confidence in "reason," which they
    understood to mean common sense, a factor equally distributed among men.
    Neglect of the use of common sense has produced in the world class
    distinctions, differences in knowledge and language; it has fomented hatred and
    wars. Reason must undertake the task of abolishing or reducing these
    differences to a minimum; it must assume the office of formulating a universal
    knowledge and establishing a universal organization of peaceful peoples
    governed by universal laws.


    Nature
    should be the starting point in the process of effecting this new organization.
    But "nature" for French Illuminism meant
    human nature devoid of all moral and religious restraint. French Illuminism was hence eminently anti-historical and
    naturalistic, and consequently tended to give rise to countless problems of
    both a doctrinal and practical nature, the solutions to which are most contrary
    to historical tradition and the teachings of Christian philosophy.


    In the
    doctrinal field, Descartes, a Rationalist and spiritualist, was replaced by
    John Locke, whose empiricism was rapidly reduced to simple sensism
    by the French philosophers. Newton's physical mechanism took the
    place of traditional metaphysics. Not only is the world a self-made machine,
    but man himself is a self-moving machine with no dependence whatsoever upon any
    principle superior to matter. Julien Offroy de
    La Mettrie (1709-1751), author of L'homme machine; and more important
    still, Paul Heinrich Holbach
    (1723-1789), German by birth but French by education and author of Le Systeme de la nature; and Claude
    Adrien Helvetius
    (1715-1771), author of De l'esprit and De
    l'homme,
    were the most outstanding protagonists
    of this atheistic materialism.


    Of
    course not all French Illuminists were atheists as were La Mettrie
    and Holbach. Many of them, notably Diderot, Rousseau, Voltaire, proposed Deism in place of
    atheism, if not for speculative reasons, at least as a support and foundation
    for moral activity. Belief in God, in the immortality of the soul, and in a retribution in the life to come were affirmed in
    opposition to atheism. Voltaire, who fought as ardently against atheism as he
    did against the Church, wrote: "If God did not exist, it would be necessary
    to invent Him. But all nature proclaims that He exists."


    In the
    field of religion, French Illuminism battled against
    the Catholic Church, its dogmas, its discipline, its hierarchy. The Church was
    judged responsible for all the errors of the past. In this bitter struggle
    against the Church, atheists like La Mettrie and
    Deists like Voltaire made common cause and cried out: "Crush the
    infamous!"


    In
    politics, a new organization, English in pattern, was called forth to effect
    the reforms demanded by reason. This rational state was outlined by Charles Louis de Secondat,
    Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1775) (picture) in his book L'esprit de lois
    (The Spirit of Laws), which was widely read and made a great impression on the
    thinkers of the times.


    To
    spread and popularize these ideas, French Illuminism
    made use of a very powerful medium, the Dictionnaire
    Raisonne des sciences, des arts et
    des metiers,
    or Encyclopedie,
    as it came to be called. This work, which can be considered fundamental and
    which spread throughout France and the rest of Europe, was published between 1751 and
    1780 in thirty-five volumes, including supplements, illustrations and indexes.
    The directors of the Encyclopedie were Jean Le Rond d'Alembert (1717?-1783), who wrote the famous Discours preliminaire
    as a preface, and Denis Diderot
    (1713-1784) (picture).
    However, many other Illuminists also contributed to the Encyclopedie,
    and for this reason this group of writers came to be known as the Encyclopedists. The most famous of the Encyclopedists were Voltaire and Rousseau.


    The
    most prominent figure of French Illuminism and of
    European contemporary culture is Francois Marie Arouet,
    who took the name Voltaire
    (1694-1778) (picture). He
    was the author of many works, the most interesting from the point of view of
    philosophy being the following: Lettres anglaises ou philosophiques,
    Metaphysique de Newton, Elements de la philosophie de
    Newton, and Dictionnaire
    philosophique.





    II. The
    Sensationalism of Abbe de Condillac


    A
    typical philosopher of French Illuminism was Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780),
    a member of a distinguished legal family of Grenoble. Although ordained a Catholic
    priest, Condillac never exercised the priestly
    powers. For about ten years he was tutor t the ducal court of the Infant
    Ferdinand de Bourbon at Parma. His most significant philosophical work is the Traite des sensations.


    Locke
    had distinguished two sources of our ideas, sensation and reflection. Condillac accepted only the former, and considered
    reflection as an activity following upon and connected with sensation.
    Moreover, Locke presupposed certain faculties of the soul, such as thinking,
    remembering, reasoning, to be innate and did not investigate their origin. The
    task of Condillac was to show how these activities
    originate in sensation alone.


    To
    this end he took as an example a statue, endowed like man with a soul, but
    deprived of any sensation ("tabula rasa") because the soul is enclosed in marble. The
    statue is first given the use of the sense of smell, the least important of the
    five senses. A rose is presented to the statue. The statue has the
    "sensation" of odor; indeed, it is entirely identified with the odor
    of rose. From this simple olfactory sensation, Condillac
    believed he could derive all the so-called spiritual faculties. Indeed, when
    the statue turns its entire capacity for feeling upon the impression of the
    rose, attention is achieved.


    A
    faint sensation (produced when the rose is withdrawn) gives rise to memory;
    a vivid memory produces imagination. Through memory the statue
    can compare an actual sensation with a past one, and from this comparison arises judgment. The practical development of the
    spirit proceeds in parallel fashion with its theoretical unfolding.


    From a
    pleasant or painful sensation the sentiment of pleasure or pain arises.
    The remembrance of a pleasant sensation gives rise to desire; a vivid
    desire produces passion; a stable desire is transformed into will.
    The statue acquires all these faculties with the use of one sense only. By
    granting to the statue the use of the other senses, the number of objects
    is extended, the quantity of the ideas is
    increased, but not the forms of activity by which it apprehends.


    According
    to Condillac, neither olfactory nor gustatory nor
    auditory nor even visual sensations give to the statue the idea of spatial
    extent upon which our knowledge of the corporeal world is founded. Only touch
    is capable of giving the spirit an idea of the external world, of one's own
    body and the bodies of others, because of the resistance which our
    physical efforts meet in the exterior world.


    It is
    to be noted, however, that this is not a proof of the reality of the
    external world; the statue still remains in the world of sensations, which are subjective
    modifications. The external world is dogmatically presupposed; we are face
    to face with metaphysical Skepticism.




    III. Jean Jacques Rousseau


    Life and Works


    Born
    in Geneva in 1712, Rousseau (
    picture) led an errant and
    tormented life. At sixteen, while apprenticed to an engraver, he ran away and
    wandered to Savoy. He found shelter, first, with
    the pastor at Confignon and later, in Annecy, with Madame de Warens, who remained his patroness for many years. In 1741
    he went to Paris, where he was obliged to earn
    his living as a copyist of music, as a tutor, and a secretary. In 1750 he took
    part in an open contest sponsored by the Academy of Dijon, succeeded in winning the
    prize, and rose to fame in Europe.


    Leaving
    Paris in 1756, he retired to
    Montmorency, where he wrote his two masterpieces, the Social Contract
    and Emile. Instead of bringing him the fame he expected, these
    two works evoked the opposition of civil and ecclesiastical authorities, and
    Rousseau was forced to go into exile.


    He
    went first to Switzerland, and then to England, where he was a guest of David
    Hume. Estranged from Hume by suspicions and petty quarrels, he returned to Paris in 1770; he died of apoplexy in
    Ermenonville in 1778. A Calvinist, Rousseau was early
    in life converted to Catholicism, only to abandon it and to return to
    Protestantism.


    Doctrine


    Rousseau
    is truly the most original figure of French Illuminism,
    of which he was not only a protagonist but also a severe critic. He possessed
    the characteristics common to the Illuminati; namely, a great faith in reason,
    and a deep-rooted desire to bring history, tradition, and society to trial.


    On the
    other hand, he was suspicious of the arts and sciences, of those very things
    which were believed to be the greatest achievements of Illuminism
    and considered the paramount factors of civilization and happiness.


    As far
    as Rousseau is concerned, the growth of culture produces an increase of
    indigence and corruption. The source of true human values is not the intellect
    but sentiment, which is possessed equally by all. Hence his continuous
    refrain was: "Let us return to nature." But what does Rousseau mean
    by nature?


    In his
    earlier writings Rousseau identified nature with the primitive state of savage
    man. Later, especially under the criticism of Voltaire, Rousseau took nature to
    mean the spontaneity of the process by which man builds his personality
    and his world. Nature thus signifies interiority, integrity, spiritual freedom,
    as opposed to that imprisonment and enslavement which society imposes in the
    name of civilization.


    Hence,
    to go back to nature means to restore to man the forces of this natural
    process, to place him outside every oppressing bond of society and the
    prejudices of civilization. Rousseau developed these concepts in his two
    masterpieces, the Social Contract and Emile.


    The "Social Contract"


    This
    work contains Rousseau's political thought. The problem which he proposes to
    solve is this: Society implies distinction between sovereign and subjects, with
    the submission of the latter to the former. How is it possible, in a society so
    composed, to preserve equality and liberty in the subjects? Liberty comes to
    man from nature, and belongs to every associate of society as an inalienable
    right.


    Rousseau
    resolved the question by distinguishing between "the general will"
    and "the will of all," giving to this latter a meaning opposite the
    former. "The general will" is the expression of the humanity immanent
    in every man, and for this reason such a will is inalienable, universal and
    uniform in every man. "The will of all," on the contrary, is the expression
    of particular interests, of egoism; it is the font of all inequalities.
    According to Rousseau, liberty consists in the spontaneous coordination of the
    "general will" and the "will of all."


    Primitive
    man was free because, without being forced, he submitted his individualistic
    interests to the exigencies of his humanity. The social contract has not
    changed this condition, for men, making such a contract, intended to fuse the
    general of all associated persons by a "pactum unionis" (and not by a "pactum
    subjectionis," as Hobbes maintained), in such a
    manner that their liberty might be conserved even in society. It is this
    "general will," and not any particular group or person, which is
    invested with sovereignty.


    Laws
    are just in so far as they express this general will. Thus every associated
    person, by obeying the general will and the laws that flow from it, does
    nothing more than obey himself. Hence hi is still free and feels his entire
    dignity as a free man, even in the society of which he forms a part.


    "Emile"


    In
    this work Rousseau offers an example of what he thinks education, in accordance
    with the spontaneity of nature, should be. He says that nature is good, and
    hence an education in keeping with the properties of nature will also be good,
    unless this process is destroyed by outside prejudices. The pupil has to feel
    himself free in developing his activities. The educator may never impose his
    will upon the pupil by precepts. His work should consist in preparing the
    fittest external conditions for the free unfolding of the activities of his
    pupil.


    In
    keeping with his principle that culture and the sciences are causes of evil and
    corruption, Rousseau wants Emile, the hero of his work by that name, to learn
    only those notions that will be necessary to his practical life. Thus he will
    learn a trade, that of carpenter. Moral education must start with the
    burgeoning of reason, and its norms will be learned, not from the precepts of
    the educator but from the reflections of the pupil himself. Emile's religion
    will be a natural one, that is, belief in God as He reveals Himself in His
    works. Only when his education is completed can Emile enter society, for only
    then will he be able to avoid its dangers and enjoy its benefits.


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